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1
Glen Newey is greatly missed in today’s world of political theory, since his 
voice was one of the strongest, most original and brilliant (and wittiest) in the 
discipline. I miss him especially as a dear friend endowed with a great sense of 
humor and a taste for irony and occasional sarcasm, and as a partner in phil-
osophical dialogue, especially when it comes to the topic of toleration which 
was an interest we shared and often brought us together (and divided us phil-
osophically). Over the years, ever since his first book on toleration, Virtue, 
Reason and Toleration, appeared in 1999, we had endless debates about this 
topic, and the trajectory of his thought between that book and the more re-
cent (2013) one, Toleration in Political Conflict, would be a topic for a whole 
article. Glen did not start out as the realist Hobbesian-Schmittian he became 
over the years. His first book is heavily Aristotelian, arguing for toleration as a 
virtue of character stressing supererogation, although one can already see the 
later Newey, with his skepticism concerning political justification, glimpsing 
through.
In my following (very) brief remarks, I would like to address what I 
consider the fundamental issue at stake between Newey’s and my own ap-
proach – namely, assuming we agree (as we did) that toleration is a concept 
that cannot rise above political struggles and power plays, how should we 
react to this as theorists? 
1 I presented these thoughts at the Memorial Symposium for Glen Newey in Leiden in 
August of 2018. I have not changed their dialogical character, in honor of a friend who 
loved fast and sharp conversation.
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Glen held a clear view on this question. Not unlike Thrasymachus, he 
doubted that there could be any normative factor – of morality, of reason, or 
what have you – that could elevate us above the power struggles and norma-
tive arbitrariness of political life. As he writes in Toleration in Political Conflict: 
“Perhaps political actors can be brought within some entirely general scheme 
of justification. But it will not be adequately supported by norms that abstract 
from the actors’ circumstances and then pronounce what they should accept, 
or would accept in some extravagantly contrary-to-fact situation”.2 
In my own book with almost the same title, Toleration in Conflict, I agree 
with this to a certain extent.3 Considering the struggles over toleration that 
have taken place since antiquity, I agree that they are part and parcel of highly 
contextual power and language games. But I pursue Frankfurt-style critical 
theory, and thus for me the historicist emphasis on contingency and the rel-
ativist stress on the normative arbitrariness of politically defined terms are 
just variants of a view that I call positivist, namely, one which need not com-
pletely abstain from taking an evaluative stance toward its subject (as extreme 
positivism advocates), but cannot provide a sufficient normative rationale for 
that very stance (what I call “normative positivism”, sometimes referred to as 
“realism”). In short, it cannot explain how its own perspective can be justi-
fied. And this is where my theory comes in, because it both reconstructs the 
historical justifications that have been given for toleration (25 in many vari-
ations) and takes the principle  and right of justification itself as the ground 
for a conception of toleration that I regard as superior to the others. 
Let me begin by explaining the points on which Glen and I agreed. We 
agreed that the concept of toleration, which involves the promise of being able 
to live with deep ethical differences without being able to resolve them, is itself 
part of such conflicts and not their neutral counterpart – descriptively speaking, 
as I would have added, though Glen would not. While some consider a ban on 
right-wing political activities to be a legitimate reflection of the limits of dem-
ocratic toleration, others regard this as intolerant. While some people tolerate 
burqas, others consider them to be intolerable for different reasons. Some are 
in favor of tolerance toward same-sex partnerships, but do not think that they 
should be accorded equal rights – others see this as intolerant and repressive. 
2 Newey 2013, 6. 
3 Forst 2013. 
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Thus, it is not only a matter of controversy how far toleration should go. 
Some of the examples cited also raise the question of whether toleration is 
even a good thing, because, on the one hand, it can go too far and, on the 
other, it can legitimize the denial of equal rights. Is toleration even the mark 
of an asymmetrical policy or a refined form of domination involving the dis-
ciplining of minorities, following Kant’s dictum that the name of tolerance 
is “arrogant,” or Goethe’s saying: “Tolerance should be a temporary attitude 
only; it must lead to recognition. To tolerate means to insult”?4 Such entan-
glements of toleration and power are some of the themes that interested both 
Glen and myself. 
We also agreed that, conceptually speaking, toleration involves three com-
ponents (following Preston King): objection, acceptance and rejection.5 We 
disagreed over whether the tolerating agent necessarily needs to be in a po-
sition of power, as Glen thought, or whether, as I believe, one can also be 
intolerant without being in a position of power (as, for example, Ayatollah 
Khomeini was before the revolution in Iran). The task of toleration, as a re-
flexive social practice, is to establish the correct normative order among these 
three components. The associated reasons can have different origins. All three 
can have religious sources, such as when one objects to a different religion 
as false, but tolerates it in the spirit of peace until it leads to blasphemy. The 
reasons in question can also be of different kinds, however, such as when a 
religious objection speaks against a certain practice while acceptance as well 
as rejection reasons appeal to human rights (of religious liberty for acceptance 
and bodily integrity for drawing the limits, for example). To be sure, these 
reasons do not reside in the concept of toleration itself; tolerance is a virtue 
that is dependent on other normative resources. This was also a point of 
agreement between Glen and me. 
But then we parted company. For while I suggested that we should distin-
guish between various conceptions of toleration, Glen was skeptical, because 
he thought that I was trying to make room for a conception he took to be 
chimerical in the sense of the above quotation, namely, one which assumes a 
normative level of justification to some extent above the conflicts over justifi-
cation. This is a charge to which I plead guilty because I see no alternative if 
4 Kant 1996, 21; Goethe 1999, 116 (tr. altered). 
5 Forst 2013, §1.
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our aim is to argue for a conception of toleration that is normatively justifi-
able in an impartial or rational way. In my view, this is what the whole critical 
project of a philosophy of toleration is about. 
The first conception of toleration I call the permission conception.6 It 
can be found in the classical toleration laws, such as in the Edict of Nantes 
(1598) or the English Toleration Act (1689). Toleration on this conception is 
a generous, but also an authoritarian, attitude and practice that permits mi-
norities to live according to their faith – albeit within a framework prescribed 
unilaterally by the permission-granting side. The tolerated are marked and 
indulged as second-class citizens, and hence rely on the protection by the 
monarch (and the dominant church). This is the (vertical) notion of  tolera-
tion that Goethe and Kant have in mind in their critiques. 
But there is more to the story. In modern times, a contrasting horizontal 
conception of toleration develops in the course of the long history of dem-
ocratic revolutions – the respect conception. The key idea underlying this 
conception is that toleration is an attitude of democratic citizens toward each 
other, which means that “the state” is no longer the agent of toleration, as 
Glen noted in his discussion of my view.7 Democratic citizens are aware that 
they disagree on central issues of the good and proper life, yet still accept that 
their shared institutions must be based on norms that all can share as free 
and equal persons and are not simply stipulated and legislated by the system 
of values of one group that the others can reasonably reject. The objection 
components remain part of the space of definitions of individuals or their 
communities, but the components of acceptance and rejection are defined in 
a reciprocal and general process of public justification. Tolerance is the virtue 
of tolerating beliefs and practices with which one does not agree, but which 
do not violate any principles that reflect the equality and freedom of all. The 
person of the other is respected; his or her convictions and actions are toler-
ated. The state aims to be neutral with respect to reasonably rejectable values 
(though not with respect to general moral norms) and it requires the citizens 
to be tolerant in that sense.
It was one of the greatest seventeenth-century thinkers, Pierre Bayle, who 
captured this normative logic of toleration best. According to Bayle, if both 
6 See Forst 2013, §2.
7 Newey 2013, 99.
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parties to the internecine religious conflicts in France of his time insisted that 
their ideas should apply to everyone and be dominant, then any crime could 
be portrayed in principle as a pious deed. Against this he argued that human 
reason must be able to find a language in which an injustice can actually be 
called an injustice – for example, the injustice of forced conversion or of ex-
pulsion or torture. If such impartiality, informed by the real horrors of social 
life, is not possible, toleration can never be more than permission or a modus 
vivendi – and thus is prey to the arbitrariness of contingent social forces and 
power relations.8 We would be mistaken if we optimistically believed that 
in our democratic age we had overcome the former conception in favor of 
the latter – the contrary is the case. Many contemporary disputes involve 
conflicts between proponents of both conceptions, and the permission con-
ception reappears in a majoritarian guise. While some people, for example, 
think that minarets and mosques should be tolerated provided that they con-
fine themselves to the framework laid down by Christian majorities, others 
insist that having suitable places of worship is a basic equal right. 
Glen was not a majoritarian, but he believed that permission toleration 
is basically all that is possible and realistic. I am not sure this is true. But 
be that as it may; there are two questions here, one primarily a matter for 
sociology – What is realistic? – the other for philosophy: What is right? The 
latter question must be answered with normative reasons and, in my view, 
with considerations of justice. For what else is the question: “What status 
and rights ought minorities or certain groups to have in a society?” except 
a question of justice? The central connection between justice and toleration 
consists in the following question: Does my objection to a practice rest on 
reasons that are not merely a reflection of my ethical or religious position that 
others, after all, do not share and do not have to share, but on reasons that 
are sufficient to proceed to a rejection – hence reasons that, for example, are 
sufficiently strong to justify prohibiting this practice with legal means? Being 
tolerant means that you accept that justice is relevant when moving from 
objection to rejection. 
What do I have to accept in order to answer this question within the 
framework of the respect conception? This touches on a difficult epistemo-
logical point, because toleration is often accused of demanding that one 
8 Forst 2013, §18.
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question one’s position in a skeptical spirit – and Glen thought that, too. He 
maintained that if a fundamentalist Christian has to accept that his objection 
to homosexuality is publicly treated as a judgment that cannot be reciprocally 
and generally justified among equals, his right to justification may not have 
been met9 (which I doubt) – although Glen admitted that if the fundamen-
talist accepted the boundary of reciprocal and general justification, he would 
be tolerant in accordance with the respect conception. But Glen neither 
thought that there was a higher- order moral duty to respect that threshold 
nor did he think that the threshold would deliver results beyond reasonable 
disagreement – because there would always be “reasonable disagreements 
about what is reasonable.”10 And to insist on a standard of reasonableness be-
yond such disagreements would just mean dressing up substantive judgments 
as impartial ones, which in his view they are not. 
This is the main challenge posed by Glen. But note that in this critique he 
still speaks of ‘reasonable disagreements’, seemingly being unwilling to allow 
for completely arbitrary definitions of what counts as reasonable and main-
taining a distinction between reasonable and unreasonable disagreements. 
But then how do we define that mysterious faculty called ‘reason’? 
According to my view, being reasonable in contexts of religious conflict 
does not require that one doubts the truth of one’s own religion. But one ac-
knowledges that religious (or other) beliefs about the good life are neither ver-
ifiable nor falsifiable by rational means. They are situated in the realm that 
Bayle called dessus de la raison, beyond the scope of reason as it were, but are 
not necessarily irrational (unless they involve superstition). This is the realm of 
faith. Reason allows many ethical positions of faith among which it cannot and 
must not decide itself. The epistemic component must be supplemented with a 
normative one. I must also accept that I owe others who live with me under a 
shared system of norms reasons for such norms that we can share morally and 
politically as equal normative authorities, and in particular do not stem from 
the fund of convictions that are matters of reasonable ethical dispute. It is un-
reasonable in a moral-political sense to legislate one’s own values of faith as gen-
erally and reciprocally binding norms in a society divided by faith. The faculty 
of reason as the faculty of public justification then combines theoretical and 
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moral elements, and this entails discursive work, because what is reciprocally 
generalizable cannot be determined a priori, although we do have guidelines as 
to what is (reciprocally and generally) justifiable and which forms of disrespect 
cannot be tolerated. So Glen was right to insist that there will be debates about 
what can be reasonably justified, but he was wrong to infer that such debates 
are open-ended, for want of any impartial standards that at least noumenally 
and normatively supersede such debates. 
This, to sum up, is where the spade turns, to use a Wittgensteinian phrase 
Glen would have liked. If we think that the Christian fundamentalist has no 
good reason to outlaw or discriminate against homosexual practices, then we 
should call him unreasonable if he does so. And in order to do this we need 
an account of reason that justifies us doing so – for reason is nothing but the 
faculty of justification. We cannot regard our notion of reason as merely ‘our’ 
reason alongside liberal conceptions of reason, Christian conceptions and 
so on. At some point, we have to leave the ‘extravagance’ of such positivist 
relativism and take a stance and explain what reason is and what it means in 
such conflicts. Not to do so would amount to a lack of both contextual par-
ticipation and of philosophical distance and reflection. Unreason may prevail 
politically, but as critical theorists we must cultivate a language to call it thus 
and not just present a sophisticated protocol of social power.
So, as will be apparent, our conversation was not just one about tolera-
tion. It was also about what we do when we do political philosophy and when 
we think about social and political issues in an engaged way. It was about 
ourselves. And for this and many other reasons I wish Glen could be with us 
to continue this dialogue.
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